

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT**

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-SIXTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 23 April 1964, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. P. Thomas

(United Kingdom)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

<u>Brazil:</u>	Mr. E. HOSANNAH
<u>Bulgaria:</u>	Mr. K. LUKANOV
	Mr. G. GHELEV
	Mr. D. TEKHOV
	Mr. G. YANKOV
<u>Burma:</u>	U SAIN BWA
	U HTOON SHEIN
<u>Canada:</u>	Mr. E.L.M. BURNS
	Mr. S.F. RAE
	Mr. R.M. TAIT
	Mr. P.D. LEE
<u>Czechoslovakia:</u>	Mr. M. ZIEMLA
	Mr. T. LAHODA
	Mr. J. BUCEK
	Mr. V. VAJNAR
<u>Ethiopia:</u>	Ato A. AGEDE
	Ato S. TEFERRA
<u>India:</u>	Mr. R.K. NEHRU
	Mr. K.P. LUKOSE
	Mr. K. NARENDRANATH
<u>Italy:</u>	Mr. F. CAVALLETTI
	Mr. E. GUIDOTTI
	Mr. S. AVETTA
	Mr. G.P. TOZZOLI

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

<u>Mexico:</u>	Mr. Ernesto de SANTIAGO Miss E. AGUIRRE Mr. Manuel TELLO
<u>Nigeria:</u>	Mr. L.C.N. OBI
<u>Poland:</u>	Mr. M. LOBODYCZ Mr. E. STANIEWSKI Mr. J. GOLDBLAT
<u>Romania:</u>	Mr. V. DUMITRESCU Mr. E. GLASER Mr. I. IACOB Mr. V. CONSTANTINESCU
<u>Sweden:</u>	Mr. P. LIND Mr. P. HAMMARSKJOLD Mr. J. PRAWITZ
<u>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:</u>	Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN Mr. I.G. USACHEV Mr. V.V. SHUSTOV Mr. I.I. CHEPROV
<u>United Arab Republic:</u>	Mr. A. OSMAN Mr. M. KASSEM Mr. S.E. IBRAHIM Mr. A. ABDEL SALAM
<u>United Kingdom:</u>	Mr. Peter THOMAS Sir Paul MASON Mr. J.G. TAHOURDIN Miss E.J.M. RICHARDSON

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

United States of America:

Mr. A.S. FISHER

Mr. A.L. RICHARDS

Mr. D.S. MacDONALD

Mr. R.A. MARTIN

Deputy Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (United Kingdom): I declare open the one hundred and eighty-sixth meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

I should like to refer to the announcement which has been made since our last meeting of the death of Dimitri Ganev, the Chairman of the Presidium of the National Assembly of Bulgaria. I feel sure that it will be the wish of the Committee that I should express our deep sympathy to the representatives of Bulgaria.

Mr. ZEMLA (Czechoslovakia): Before making my statement I should like, on behalf of the Czechoslovak delegation, to extend to the Bulgarian delegation our profound sympathy at the sudden demise of Mr. Dimitri Ganev, Chairman of the Presidium of the National Assembly of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, who was an outstanding statesman of Bulgaria.

At the last meeting our delegation had the opportunity of expressing its satisfaction at the statements made by the Governments of the Soviet Union (ENDC/131), the United States (ENDC/132) and the United Kingdom, which have decided to reduce the production of fissionable materials for military purposes. Even though this is not a disarmament measure in the proper sense of the word, it is a valuable contribution to the strengthening of confidence in international relations, as was rightly pointed out by all the delegations in our Committee.

The decision made by the Governments of the three nuclear Powers received a favourable response from the world public as a new contribution towards the positive development of international relations which started with the signing of the Moscow Treaty and other agreements in 1963. However, it cannot change the regrettable fact that the negotiations of the Eighteen-Nation Committee have not been fruitful, even as regards the field of collateral measures. This fact rightly arouses concern both in our Committee and in the world.

In our opinion, the decision of the Governments of the three Powers directly invites us to intensify our efforts to make headway in our negotiations. There is no doubt that we have all the prerequisites for this. After all, the statements of the Governments of the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom have again confirmed the feasibility and significance of unilateral steps by governments in the form of mutual example aimed at a relaxation of international tensions.

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Our Committee might also contribute to this trend if it adopted, for instance, an appeal to the governments of States to take unilateral measures to reduce their military budgets, following the example of the Soviet Union, the United States and other States, as was proposed by the delegation of the Soviet Union (ENDC/PV.157, p.14) and on 9 April by the delegation of the United Arab Republic (ENDC/PV.182, p.15). A step in this direction would only confirm the fact that our Committee is aware of its responsibilities and intends to render a contribution to the improvement of the atmosphere and the strengthening of confidence in the relations among States, as well as the slackening of the arms race, by its own concrete actions. Hardly anyone could dispute that such a step by our Committee would meet with the full support and appreciation of the world public.

However, it is not only an appeal for further reductions of military budgets that should deserve our attention. The discussions we have had in the past months have shown that also a number of other concrete proposals -- for example the proposal for adopting measures to prevent a spread of nuclear weapons, and proposals for the destruction of bomber aircraft, the creation of atom-free zones and the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the countries of the Warsaw Treaty and those of NATO (ENDC/77), as well as the other proposals contained in the memorandum of the Soviet Government of 28 January last (ENDC/123) -- offer good opportunities for reaching agreement.

Characteristic of those proposals is the fact that they are easily feasible, that they are effective as regards the slackening of the arms race and the easing of international tension, and that they do not require complicated measures, in particular in the field of control. At the same time, those proposals would substantially contribute to the strengthening of confidence in international relations and would create propitious conditions for the attainment of our principal objective, which is to reach agreement on general and complete disarmament. Therefore they have enjoyed the support of a majority of delegations in the course of our negotiations.

Only sufficient good will on the part of the Western Powers is needed for their adoption. It is regrettable that our colleagues of the Western delegations have not shown such good will as yet. They attempt to cover up their negative attitude to the proposals of the socialist countries by all kinds of constructed arguments and objections and also very often by demanding preliminary technical and expert

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studies on questions where such studies are not appropriate and where -- as, for example, on the question of the reduction of military budgets -- the decisive factor is the will of the governments concerned to bring the proposed measure to life.

As is well known, the socialist delegations have concentrated not only on gaining support for their own proposals; they have also given thorough and systematic study to the proposals submitted by the Western delegations. However, our careful analysis of those proposals has revealed that, in particular, the exaggerated demands for control stand in the way of their adoption.

The most expressive example is the proposal of the United States for a verified freeze of the number and characteristics of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles (ENDC/120), which was elaborated in detail on 16 April by the representative of the United States, Mr. Fisher (ENDC/PV.184, pp. 13 et seq.). The same holds true concerning the Western concept of the proposals to set up permanent observation posts and to halt underground nuclear tests, and others.

With regard to the United States proposal for a verified freeze of strategic delivery vehicles, the socialist delegations have already said that in actual fact that proposal is a transparent attempt to replace effective disarmament measures by the installation of control over armaments and existing weapons. The statement made on this question at the 184th meeting by the leader of the United States delegation only reaffirmed our conviction.

Nobody can prove that the freeze constitutes a disarmament measure. It is clear that, should it be carried out, not a single missile, not a single bomber and not a single strategic nuclear weapon delivery vehicle would be destroyed. After all, this has been admitted -- without consistency -- in the statements of the representatives of the Western delegations. In other words, this means that the United States proposal would not reduce the danger of a nuclear war in any way, for the numbers of strategic delivery vehicles and the stockpiles of nuclear weapons existing today are capable of effecting multiple destruction on the other side. Nevertheless, in connexion with that proposal the Western Powers demand almost comprehensive control.

The exposé of the representative of the United States could not refute the fact that the United States proposal would leave open the possibilities for a further increase of armaments in the field of missiles having a range of up to 1,000 kilometres and various types of fighters capable of delivering nuclear warheads.

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We cannot help wondering whether that proposal, coupled with the adamant opposition of the Western delegations to the dismantling of military bases on foreign territories -- and, in particular, of those in the vicinity of the socialist countries -- does not attest to the Western Powers' attempting to gain certain advantages over the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries.

Equally, it remains an indisputable fact that the United States proposal for a freeze of strategic nuclear weapon delivery vehicles would in substance not cover the modern nuclear weapon delivery vehicles which even today form part of the West German Bundeswehr's armaments. The Western Powers also have failed to reply to the question put by the representative of the United Arab Republic on 9 April on whether the freeze proposal would be applied to the plan to create the so-called NATO multilateral nuclear force (ENDC/PV.132, p.9).

Our principal reservations on the United States proposal for a freeze of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles are based primarily on the fact that its implementation would be connected with such extensive control as to be quite unacceptable because its scope and nature would go far beyond the scope and nature of the measures to be carried out under that proposal. Such control would, indeed, seriously endanger the security of States.

According to Mr. Fisher's statement, the control would imply providing complete information on all production and testing facilities to which the agreement would apply; a continuing inspection of all the declared facilities; a specified number of spot-check inspections per year to detect the undeclared locations where, allegedly, clandestine production of delivery vehicles or construction of launching sites might take place; the stationing of observers to verify all space launchings and all allowed test firings of missiles; finally, such control would include observation of the destruction of -- or, in the case of accidents, other confirmation of -- vehicles and other launchers to be replaced.

Where would such extensive demands for control lead? The types of delivery vehicles specified in the United States proposal -- including the missiles having a range of 100 kilometres or greater -- indicate that foreign observers would have free access to the most important areas of the armament industries of States. Not only that: under the pretext of verifying possible clandestine production, these observers might demand access to practically all major industrial plants.

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All this is further accentuated by the demand for a specific number of annual spot-checks to guard against undeclared activities. No doubt this would actually be tantamount to opening practically the whole territories of States to unrestricted seeking of information in the fields most important for defence, and on all types of weapons. Such broad control would be instituted without starting any disarmament measures. Despite all these facts, the Western delegations declare -- as the representative of Italy did on 16 April -- that they "never call for a greater degree of control than is strictly necessary" (ENDC/PV.184, p.43).

The United States delegation has apparently realized this weak point of its own proposal, as regards the scope of control. Whereas Mr. Foster stated on 31 January that "verification can be effective without being burdensome" (ENDC/PV.162, p.19), Mr. Fisher on 16 April made a more careful statement, namely:

"... the verification system for the measure which we are now exploring would be less extensive than that required for general and complete disarmament." (ENDC/PV.184, p.18).

This, naturally, only confirms that the United States freeze proposal aims at introducing control over armaments.

In an attempt to justify the unacceptable demands in the field of control and to defend the United States proposal, individual Western delegations act contrary to logic and make contradictory statements. In one specific connexion they admit that the United States proposal does not constitute a disarmament measure. For example, the representative of Italy, Mr. Cavalletti, entering into polemics with my delegation on 2 April, declared that the word "freeze" indicated that the measure would not lead to the destruction of a single delivery vehicle. But immediately after that he reached a surprising conclusion, namely: "the freeze is in itself a genuine measure of disarmament" (ENDC/PV.180, p.14).

The assertion that the freeze is a disarmament measure naturally cannot be taken seriously. This has been confirmed by, inter alia, the statement of the representative of Canada, Mr. Burns, on 9 April when he defined disarmament as "the actual physical destruction of weapons or disbandment of forces" and clearly said that the freeze of strategic nuclear **vehicles** did not come within the category of disarmament measures (ENDC/PV.182, p.17).

We find equally unclear on what premise the representative of the United States, Mr. Fisher, based his statement on 16 April that the freeze "would not involve verification of the levels or the deployment of existing armaments" (ENDC/PV.184, p.18), though he had declared only shortly before that "Control over

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the number of missile launchers is an essential element of the programme" (ibid., p.17). In our view those two statements are obviously contradictory. Therefore I should like to ask the United States delegation where it sees a difference between the "control over the number" and the "verification of the levels". How would the control over launching facilities be carried out without verifying at the same time the deployment of these facilities and, simultaneously, the number of missiles stationed on them?

These facts constitute evidence that the United States proposal for a freeze envisages controls of such scope that they would have nothing in common either with the demand for a relaxation of international tension or with increasing mutual confidence in international relations and creating conditions for disarmament. The United States proposal would lead to the contrary. Moreover, it would make it possible for a potential aggressor to gain information he would need for preparing aggression and to renounce the treaty at any time.

How, then, can the representatives of the Western Powers believe that the United States proposal for a freeze of the number of strategic nuclear weapon delivery vehicles in its present form is a realistic proposal and may be acceptable to the socialist countries? We are convinced that no government which protects the interests of the security and defence of its own country could ever agree to such a measure. Therefore the United States proposal cannot facilitate our progress in the negotiations.

I should like to assure the Western delegations that, in criticizing the United States proposal for a verified freeze of strategic nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, my delegation has been guided only by the desire to take the negotiations in our Committee out of the deadlock. The principal criterion in considering the proposals submitted must be whether or not they facilitate progress in our work. The pressing demand of our time, namely to eliminate the danger of a nuclear war in the shortest possible time, calls for taking more and more effective steps in the field of disarmament, towards consolidating world peace and strengthening the security of nations. This is also an obligation for us emanating from the recent decision of the Governments of the three Powers to reduce the production of fissionable materials for military uses.

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The socialist delegations have submitted suitable proposals to the Committee to achieve that objective and are ready to do their utmost so that the Committee's work might have positive results. If the Western Powers are really in favour of disarmament, as they declare all the time, then it is up to them sincerely and resolutely to strive, together with the delegations of the socialist and non-aligned countries, to achieve mutually acceptable agreements which will open before us the road to our main goal --- that is, general and complete disarmament.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): The Soviet delegation associates itself with the words of sympathy proffered by the Chairman and, for its part, expresses its profound condolence upon the untimely death of an outstanding Bulgarian statesman, the Chairman of the Presidium of the National Assembly of Bulgaria, Comrade Dmitri Ganev. We also express our sincere sympathy to the people and Government of Bulgaria, and to our Bulgarian friends in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, in connexion with the loss they have sustained.

The proposals set forth in the Soviet Government's memorandum of 28 January (ENDC/123) are linked together by a common purpose: to lessen the danger of war, slow down the arms race, and give a practical start to disarmament. This purpose is served by the proposal to reduce military budgets by 10 to 15 per cent (ibid.) --- a proposal which has been and is still being given great attention and support by the members of the Committee.

At the very beginning of the discussion the representative of Nigeria, Mr. Obi, pointed out that ---

"There would be no better demonstration of seriousness of purpose
[of the Committee] than formally to agree to ... make substantial reductions
in [military budgets]." (ENDC/PV.159, p.15)

That is a completely impartial and justified appraisal, since military budgets are the financial basis and consequently the source of the arms race. The smaller the resources allocated to military purposes, the smaller will be the basis for the arms race. For this reason the attitude adopted towards the proposal to reduce military budgets is the clearest and most concentrated pointer to the degree of seriousness of the statements about desiring really to put a brake on the arms race.

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Now everyone can draw his own conclusion as to what the position of the Western Powers betokens. They have not only not welcomed the proposal to reduce military budgets by 10 to 15 per cent, but have not shown a positive attitude even towards the proposal that the Committee should decide to issue an appeal to States to reduce their military budgets. In trying to find an explanation for this position of the United States representative, some say, for instance, that the opponents of a reduction in military budgets are gaining the upper hand in the United States itself. They also say that the United States does not wish an agreement on this question also because it is against reducing the military effort of the entire NATO bloc and is urging all its NATO allies, and in the first place Western Germany, to increase their military expenditures.

We are not going to elaborate that theme. But the fact remains that, as a result of the position of the Western Powers, the Committee has been virtually paralyzed and unable to adopt a decision on the reduction of military budgets, or even on the proposal to address an appeal to States to set about reducing their military budgets.

Let us take another matter, the importance of which has been recognized by almost all the members of the Committee. I refer to the proposal for the elimination of bomber aircraft (ENDC/123, p.5). The memorandum of the Soviet Government rightly stresses that the elimination of such powerful means of delivery of nuclear weapons as bomber aircraft still are, would diminish the risk of war and help to strengthen the security of all peoples. The Western Powers were likewise unable to put forward any well-founded objections to that proposal.

One cannot regard as serious the objection which has been raised here alleging that it would be impossible to eliminate all bomber aircraft. Equally unconvincing is the reference to the fact that bomber aircraft have a different value to different States from the viewpoint of ensuring protection. Is there no possibility of taking that fact into account during the practical implementation of the proposal to eliminate all bomber aircraft? Of course there is.

Incidentally, since that aspect of the matter has already been referred to here, it should be pointed out that the refusal of the Western Powers to eliminate bomber aircraft, under the pretext of caring for the interests of the small countries, looks rather odd. Less than a month ago, on 23 March, the peoples throughout the world learned with indignation that British bomber aircraft had made a raid on the Harib area of the Yemeni Arab Republic. That is a clear example of the use of bombers, which speaks for itself and does not require any comment, and which, incidentally, explains why the Western Powers refuse to eliminate bombers.

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We have also proposed reaching agreement on such a topical measure as the withdrawal of foreign troops from all territories of other countries. In the past we have been told by the Western Powers that the withdrawal of foreign troops from Europe would not be convenient to them, because the Warsaw Treaty countries possess an enormous advantage over the NATO countries in the field of conventional armed forces and armaments, and, moreover, the Warsaw Treaty countries are not separated from Western Europe by an ocean, as is, for instance, the United States. However, the United States Secretary for Defense, Mr. McNamara, stated authoritatively that the NATO States have not less but more conventional armed forces and armaments than the Warsaw Treaty countries.

Furthermore, the airlift of troops to Western Germany carried out by the United States towards the end of last year, as well as the recent airlift of an entire division from the United States, apparently, to Iran, as reported in the press, have confirmed the fact that with the modern technical equipment of transport aircraft an ocean is no obstacle, since in the present era -- the era of aviation -- the shortest route is by air. Consequently these objections of the Western delegations have completely lost any value.

As the position of the Western Powers, which do not wish to withdraw their troops from foreign territories, becomes increasingly difficult to defend, life itself has been providing more and more evidence of the necessity of such a withdrawal. The foreign military intervention in South Viet-nam, the coup d'état in Gabon, the atrocities of the Portuguese armed forces in Angola, the intervention of foreign troops in the internal affairs of Tanganyika, Kenya and Uganda, and the firing on the peaceful inhabitants of Panama -- all these recent events, which are the first to come to mind, testify to the fact that the presence of foreign troops in the territories of other countries is a means of repression and a source of serious conflicts.

It is worth while recalling the opinion of the new African States on the presence of foreign troops in the territories of other countries. At the eighteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly the leader of the Kenya delegation, Mr. Oginga Odinga, speaking at the plenary meeting of the Assembly when Kenya was admitted to membership in the United Nations, declared himself in favour of the unconditional liquidation of all foreign military bases in the territories of other countries, and stressed that the presence of such bases in the territories of other

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countries was a source of international tension. He also pointed out that these bases are used to suppress national liberation movements struggling for independence, and to transform into puppets the governments of the territories where these foreign bases are located (A/PV.1282, Provisional, pp.97, 98-100).

In general, the question of withdrawing foreign troops from the territories of other countries to within their own national borders has become urgent and must be settled without delay. In view of the fact that the Western Powers have not shown any willingness to agree to a radical solution -- that is, the complete withdrawal of all foreign troops -- the Soviet Government has expressed itself in favour of first reducing foreign troops, on the basis of reciprocity, and then leading up gradually, step by step, to their complete withdrawal. Thus the Soviet Government has adopted a flexible position and has done its utmost to bring about a possibility of reaching agreement on this question. Nevertheless, the Western side still persists in its position. Clinging to the maintenance of foreign troops in other countries, the Western Powers thus show their unwillingness to eliminate one of the sources of international tension.

We have also proposed a reduction of the total numbers of the armed forces of States (ENDC/123, p.2). I should like to recall that, thanks to the efforts of the Soviet Union, the question of a reduction of the armed forces of States within the framework of general and complete disarmament is, I think, one of those questions in regard to which there are relatively few obstacles to the reaching of agreement. If that is so, why then not settle this important question on a mutual basis without waiting for the beginning of the implementation of a programme of general and complete disarmament?

The Soviet delegation has quoted in the Committee the specific figures concerning the repeated and very considerable reductions in the armed forces of the Soviet Union which it has carried out unilaterally (ENDC/PV.184, pp.30, 31). At present we are carrying out a further reduction in the total numbers of our armed forces. But one side cannot for ever go on reducing its armed forces unilaterally while the opposite military group is not only not reducing but is actually increasing the level of its forces.

Such a development of events is all the more dangerous to the cause of peace as the growth of the armed forces of NATO is taking place, above all, as a result of an increase in the Bundeswehr, in which the leading role is played by West German militarists and revenge-seekers. Today the West German Bundeswehr is already second

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only to the troops of the United States in numbers, while the West German generals are pushing all the other Western partners into the background in the organs of NATO. The ominous character of what is happening is beginning to dawn upon people's minds in the social circles of the West. Not only the Western European press but also the American press have been compelled to write about the alarm and apprehensions that are becoming ever greater in Western Europe in face of the intensive growth of West German militarism.

In carrying out a reduction in our armed forces, we called upon the United States and its allies in the North Atlantic bloc to follow our example. We are prepared either to conclude an appropriate international agreement or to carry out reductions in armed forces by way of unilateral but equivalent actions, to be carried out over approximately the same period of time, by each of the two sides. During the past three months' work of the Committee it would have been quite possible to come to an agreement had the Western Powers shown any willingness to do so; but they kept their lips sealed.

What is happening in the Committee to the proposal for the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the NATO and the Warsaw Treaty countries (ENDC/77) is quite beyond us. The conclusion of such a pact, which would in no way upset the existing balance of forces between the two groups, would bring into international relations an element of stability and calm which is so much needed. But in regard to this question also the Western Powers have blocked all paths to its solution.

The Soviet delegation came to this session of the Committee fully determined to work out effective measures against any further spread of nuclear weapons. We consider it to be the duty of every State to do everything possible to avert, before it is too late, the danger of nuclear weapons spreading throughout the world. It is essential to close all channels --- not only the direct but also the indirect ones -- by which nuclear weapons might come into the hands of those who twice during this century have caused the conflagration of a world war and are now intensively striving to get hold of nuclear weapons.

The quarantine in regard to nuclear weapons must be complete, without any loopholes, otherwise it will be not only useless but manifestly detrimental to the security of other States. That is why we insist that an agreement on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons should contain, besides the prohibition to transfer directly such weapons or to give information on their manufacture, also provisions to guarantee that the transfer of nuclear weapons or access to them shall not take place either directly or indirectly -- that is, through military blocs.

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No matter how the transfer of nuclear weapons or of control over them may be carried out, whether it be to a State or to a group of States, the fact remains that it is still the transfer of nuclear weapons or of control over them. It is useless for the Western representatives to try to dispute this obvious truth and even to prove that a NATO multilateral nuclear force would not lead to the dissemination of nuclear weapons or to their transfer into the hands of West German revenge-seekers. The Western Powers, and the United States in the first place, should realize that they are playing with fire. They burned their hands in a similar way in the past, when they helped in the re-arming of Germany before the Second World War. Today the consequences of such a policy, so fraught with tremendous dangers for mankind, could be far more catastrophic.

The Western Powers have recently provided the Committee with tangible proof that the creation of a NATO multilateral nuclear force will lead to the arming of Western Germany with nuclear weapons. This is the explanation of the Western Powers' refusal to respond to the message of the German Democratic Republic of 3 February (ENDC/124). The Government of the German Democratic Republic not only took the lead in proposing the complete renunciation of nuclear weapons by the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany, but also stressed from the very beginning that it did not link this problem to the question of diplomatic recognition. Thus it was shown that there did not exist any of the so-called political difficulties to which the Western Powers referred in trying to avoid the implementation of measures for normalizing the situation in Europe.

If the Committee had supported the proposal to --

"... suggest to the General Assembly of the United Nations to recommend that the States possessing nuclear weapons should withdraw from German territory any nuclear weapons they have stationed there, and that they should undertake to respect the two German States as areas permanently free of nuclear weapons, against which nuclear weapons may on no account be used" (ibid., p.4)

that would undoubtedly have been a significant step towards the strengthening of peace in Central Europe.

In connexion with the question of measures to prevent the further dissemination of nuclear weapons and the question of establishing denuclearized zones, we cannot fail to recall the proposal of the Polish People's Republic for the freezing of nuclear weapons in Central Europe. The Soviet Government takes a positive attitude towards the initiative of the Government of the Polish People's Republic in

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that regard. In our opinion, the significance of an agreement to freeze nuclear weapons in Central Europe is to be seen, above all, in the fact that it would block the access of West German revenge-seekers to nuclear weapons.

The proposals contained in the Soviet Government's memorandum of 28 January provide an opportunity to reach agreement also on the implementation of measures to prevent surprise attack, on the establishment of denuclearized zones, and on the prohibition of underground nuclear weapon tests. The members of the Committee are acquainted with our position on these matters.

The Soviet Government is prepared to give an undertaking to respect the status of denuclearized zones, wherever and whenever they may be established. It is prepared to extend the agreement banning nuclear weapon tests (ENDC/100/Rev.1) to underground nuclear explosions as well, for which no special international control is required. We are prepared to establish, on the territories of the countries belonging to the two opposing groups of States, a network of observation posts in conjunction with certain measures for the relaxation of international tension, such as a reduction in the numbers of foreign troops in the territories of European States and an undertaking not to station nuclear weapons in the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany. It is characteristic that the representatives of the Western Powers in the Committee have not been willing to agree on a single one of the questions I have listed.

The Western Powers, for their part, have submitted during the session of the Committee a programme of measures of an entirely different nature. The common feature of the United States proposals is that they lead either to a switching of the arms race from one field to another or to the establishment of control over armaments without any disarmament whatsoever. The representatives of the Western Powers were particularly zealous in sounding the praises of the United States proposal for a freeze of strategic nuclear weapon delivery vehicles (ENDC/120).

However, in doing so they were very careful to avoid mentioning the fact that this proposal actually reflects the new line in the policy of the Pentagon in regard to armaments. The leaders of that department make no secret of the fact that the implementation of the United States programme for the production of the

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latest types of strategic delivery vehicles is nearing its end and that now the speeding-up of the production of non-strategic delivery vehicles has become the order of the day. In the United States proposal no reference whatsoever is made to these non-strategic delivery vehicles and other types of armaments; nor, in regard to strategic delivery vehicles, is any provision made for the destruction of a single missile or bomber. It is also noteworthy that the production base for the output of strategic nuclear weapon delivery vehicles would also remain intact.

The plants and undertakings now producing strategic missiles would continue to work even after the freeze, although at slower rates, producing missiles for the legalized replacement of those that have become unserviceable as a result of accidents or are used for testing. This production base could at any moment start working again at full capacity, for which it would be enough to announce an end to the freeze in accordance with the procedure recently explained here by the United States representative (ENDC/PV.184, p.18).

The implementation of the United States proposal for a freeze would lead to the disclosure of the defence systems of States without the implementation of any disarmament measures. That, of course, would be very dangerous from the standpoint of State security. Only a potential aggressor could be interested in that.

From statements coming from circles close to the Pentagon we know that military requirements also dictate the United States proposal (ENDC/PV.176, pp. 5 et seq.) for the destruction by the Soviet Union and the United States of an equal number of B-47 and TU-16 bombers over a period of two years. The real reason for this proposal is that the United States has decided to scrap its B-47 bombers and replace them with more modern types. The representative of Burma, Mr. Barrington, referred to this United States proposal as follows:

"With all due respect to the United States delegation, we consider that to be an inadequate measure -- inadequate as regards types, quantities and rate of destruction ..."

Mr. Barrington added that the proposal would --

"... do nothing to prevent the two super-Powers from increasing their destructive capability further by replacing these obsolete bombers with more modern means of delivery." (ENDC/PV.178, p.35)

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I have already spoken about the unsoundness of the Western Powers' approach to the question of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons, and I see no further need to dwell on the subject. There is no place here for double-dealing; the policy of creating a multilateral nuclear force is incompatible with a solution of the problem of non-dissemination of nuclear weapons.

The United States proposals for the establishment of a system of observation posts in isolation from any measures of actual disarmament are a poorly-disguised attempt to organize direct intelligence activities in the territories of the socialist States.

It is obvious that this approach by the Western Powers does not at all help towards reaching agreement on the implementation of measures to slow down the arms race and ease international tension. On the questions of the reduction of military budgets and the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons, the position of the West is openly aimed at frustrating agreement. As a result of this position of the Western Powers, the Committee has so far been unable to cope with the tasks assigned to it.

On 21 April exactly three months had passed since the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament resumed its work after a five-month recess. One cannot but recall that the Committee assembled in the favourable atmosphere brought about by the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests, (ENDC/100/Rev.1), by the agreement to refrain from placing in orbit any objects carrying nuclear weapons (A/RES/1884(XVIII); ENDC/117), and by certain reductions in the military budgets of the Soviet Union, the United States and some other countries. The Committee resumed its work at a time when there was every hope that these agreements would be followed by others and that the Committee would at last play its proper role in this matter.

Everyone remembers the very promising statements that were made three or four months ago by responsible government representatives, both in their respective capitals and here in the Eighteen-Nation Committee. They said that a favourable atmosphere had come about for the successful progress of the negotiations on the problem of general and complete disarmament and on measures aimed at halting the arms race and reducing international tension. They stated that this favourable moment must not be lost, that it would be unforgivable if

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the impetus that had been given to international relations by the aforementioned important events in international life were to be allowed to die away. They called on everyone -- except themselves -- to do everything possible to develop the success betokened by the Moscow Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests, and to achieve further agreements. But all these statements on the part of the Western Powers proved to be words unsupported by any deeds. As the saying goes, "faith without works is dead".

On 12 February 1963 the Soviet delegation to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament pointed out that the further development of international events depended to a large extent on whether the Committee moved forward or merely marked time as in the past (ENDC/PV.96, p.24).

More than a year or, more precisely, fourteen months have elapsed since then. The Committee has already accumulated a large number of proposals, most of which are really aimed at eliminating the menace of a nuclear war, halting the arms race and reducing international tension. But it must be noted with great regret that the Committee is standing just where it stood a year ago. Some of the representatives here would like to inspire others with their simulated optimism. But everyone realizes that our Committee goes on helplessly marking time. At the meeting of 24 March Mr. de Araujo Castro, who was at that time Minister for Foreign Affairs of Brazil, gave the following fairly accurate evaluation of the situation in the Committee:

"Nearly two months have elapsed, and unfortunately it seems hardly possible to continue to speak in hopeful terms. I am not unaware that patience is one of the main ingredients of negotiation. I know that ours is a fearsome task and that our goal cannot be achieved overnight. It is a work of persuasion. Yet I see no use in our trying to delude ourselves and to imagine that we are moving forward if we are at a standstill; for there is no concealing the fact that world opinion is disappointed." (ENDC/PV.177, p.8)

Many of the representatives who spoke when the negotiations were resumed at Geneva pointed out the great responsibility incumbent upon the Committee as a result of the new situation. The representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal, said that "... this Conference faces a challenge" (ENDC/PV.160, p.17), in the

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sense that the fullest advantage should be taken of the favourable situation that has come about as a result of the agreements reached last year, in order to make further progress. The representative of India, Mr. Nehru, observed very rightly that ---

"The next few months are of crucial importance, for if there is lack of progress in our work the earlier gains may be lost."

(ENDC/PV.162, p.10)

The need for progress was pointed out not only by the socialist and non-aligned delegations; judging by certain statements, even the Western delegations realized this. Thus at the first meeting of the Committee Mr. Foster said that ---

"... it would be a serious mistake to let self-congratulation lead to self-complacency". (ENDC/PV.157, p.9)

In the light of such statements one would have expected that all delegations would lose no time in getting down to serious work and would direct their energies towards seeking agreements which would carry on the good work initiated last year. Unfortunately, this has not happened in the Committee.

The past three months have shown quite clearly the need for the Western Powers to re-consider their position, which is a serious obstacle to the achievement of agreement on literally every question under consideration by the Committee. We have heard many statements by the Western representatives to the effect that nuclear war is unthinkable in these days. One must draw the appropriate conclusion from this and show willingness to co-operate in eliminating the menace of a nuclear war, in halting the arms race, and in solving the problem of general and complete disarmament.

In the statement made by the Head of the Soviet Government, Mr. Krushchev, on 20 April, it is stressed that:

"In advocating the speediest possible solution of the disarmament problem and the implementation of effective measures to end the race for armaments, especially nuclear armaments, the Soviet Government is anxious to avail itself of any opportunity for achieving in international affairs a mutual understanding with other States in regard to the necessity of avoiding a nuclear war". (ENDC/131, p.1)

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The Soviet Government has submitted to the Eighteen-Nation Committee a number of proposals that go in this direction, both in regard to general and complete disarmament as such and in regard to individual measures that would lead to general and complete disarmament. Owing to the position of the Western delegations, these proposals have never been carried out; moreover, the Committee is still far from agreeing on them.

The time has come for a radical change in the situation in the Committee. The measures taken by the Governments of the Soviet Union and the United States to reduce the production of fissionable materials for military purposes have also the positive significance that they indicate the main direction in which the efforts of States should be directed: namely, towards the elimination of the menace of a nuclear war. Here, what is needed in the first place is that the Western Powers, having soberly appraised the experience of the past three months, should abandon their rigid position and show a spirit of co-operation.

In the statement made by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Mr. Krushchev, on 20 April, announcing a reduction in the production of fissionable materials for military purposes in the Soviet Union, it is stressed that:

"It is the deep conviction of the Soviet Government that increased efforts must be made in searching for a solution of the main problems of disarmament and in adopting ever more effective measures for strengthening universal peace. This is called for by the vital interests of all States and of all peoples. The Soviet Government is prepared to take such further steps in agreement with the other Powers." (ibid., p.3)

This statement by the Head of the Soviet Government sets a clear objective and lays down the course that needs to be followed in order that the disarmament negotiations may be crowned with success.

Mr. de SANTIAGO (Mexico) (translation from Spanish): Before I begin my speech, I should like to express to the Bulgarian representative the condolences of my delegation on the death of the Chairman of the Presidium of the National Assembly of the People's Republic of Bulgaria.

My delegation has refrained from taking part more frequently in this Committee's discussions on collateral measures because it wished to give the co-Chairmen time to amplify the proposals they have submitted. We have examined these proposals carefully and also the suggestions of certain representatives of the non-aligned countries, some of which we regard as very important. All have the same object, which is also the principal object of this Committee: general and complete disarmament.

The lists of collateral measures in the message of President Johnson (ENDC/120) and in the memorandum of the Soviet Government (ENDC/123) contain a number of similar measures, such as those providing for the prohibition of all nuclear weapon tests, the prevention of the further spread of nuclear weapons, and the reduction of the threat of a nuclear war. While these proposals differ in presentation to such an extent that all some of them have in common is the title, and they give us the impression of increasing, rather than decreasing, the gap between the Great Powers, they undoubtedly have the same end in view, although they pursue it by different paths.

I have the following observations to make. The first relates to the prohibition of all nuclear weapon tests. The Mexican position on the prohibition of nuclear weapons tests in all environments is clear and well-known to you all. Our action in the United Nations has taken the form of statements and the co-sponsorship of resolutions on the subject. Where the Mexican Delegation's contribution to the work of this Committee is concerned, everyone is familiar with the efforts of my illustrious predecessor, Ambassador Padilla Norvo, with his persistence and his consistent concern to find positive solutions to this problem. His suggestions are to be found in the proceedings and documents of this Committee.

In accordance with this position, my delegation still believes that it is necessary to press for the prohibition of underground nuclear weapons tests. It therefore welcomed the view recently expressed in this Committee by the representative of Brazil (ENDC/PV.177, pp. 9, 10), later supported by the representative of the

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United Arab Republic (ENDC/PV.182, pp. 12-14), that the partial Treaty signed in Moscow (ENDC/100/Rev.1) should be extended to include underground tests down to a certain limit and beyond the 20 kiloton range, for which on-site inspection would not be required.

In this connexion the Mexican delegation would remind the Committee of the suggestion which was made in the Committee by Ambassador Padilla Nervo on 30 November 1962:

"Another question that might be explored is the possibility of prohibiting those underground explosions powerful enough to be unmistakably identified at a distance, such as explosions of a power in excess of 20 kilotons, or above such limit as scientists may determine in agreement with the parties concerned." (ENDC/99)

The Mexican delegation regards as very timely the suggestion made by Mr. Barrington, the Burmese representative, on 26 March (ENDC/PV.178, p.36) that the Sub-Committee on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests should be reactivated to study the possibility of reaching an agreement in the near future that would facilitate the prohibition of underground nuclear tests, even within the limits indicated above and even though this would mean only partial compliance with the obligation assumed in the Moscow Treaty and with the directives given in General Assembly resolution 1910 (XVIII) (ENDC/116).

My second observation relates to the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons. On 12 March Mr. Trivedi, the Indian representative, made observations on the non-dissemination of these weapons which my delegation regards as very important. He suggested --

"... that we take up seriously and realistically the question of formulating an agreement on this question." (ENDC/PV.174, p.16)

In this connexion he mentioned various resolutions adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations at its fourteenth, fifteenth and sixteenth sessions. He also suggested that the four nuclear Powers might draw up an international instrument on the lines of the Moscow Treaty in the light of the ideas contained in the resolutions submitted by Sweden and Ireland at those sessions of the United Nations General Assembly -- resolutions 1380 (XIV), 1576 (XV), 1664 and 1665 (XVI).

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President Johnson makes in his message the following proposal:

"Fifth ... to stop the spread of nuclear weapons to nations not now controlling them, let us agree:

(A) That nuclear weapons not be transferred into the national control of States which do not now control them ..." (ENDC/120, p.2)

The Soviet Government proposes in part 6 of its memorandum, dealing with prevention of the further spread of nuclear weapons, an agreement on this question prohibiting the transfer of such weapons and the giving of information on their manufacture (ENDC/123, pp. 4, 5).

My delegation believes that, since it is the aim of both nuclear Powers to reach an agreement prohibiting the dissemination of nuclear weapons, it would be feasible for them to conclude a treaty on the basis suggested by the Indian representative: the resolutions I have already mentioned. Such a treaty would deal only with the point on which agreement has already been reached: that States should "refrain from relinquishing control of nuclear weapons and from transmitting the information necessary for their manufacture to States not possessing such weapons", as specified in resolution 1665 (XVI), which was unanimously adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 4 December 1961.

A treaty of this kind would not of course solve the outstanding problem, but it could be drafted in such terms that it would not in any way prejudice a solution; that is to say, it would neither authorize nor prohibit the dissemination of nuclear weapons by means other than those referred to in the operative part of the Irish resolution, which would serve as the basis of the treaty.

The effects of such a collateral measure would be similar to those of the Moscow Treaty, which dealt only with matters on which agreement had been achieved, and excluded for the time being those on which agreement had not yet been achieved. This measure would, in addition, be in accordance with point 5 of the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations (ENDC/5). The treaty would, of course, also include that part of paragraph 1 of resolution 1665 (XVI) which I have not quoted.

My delegation considers that a treaty to prevent the dissemination of nuclear weapons must be drafted as a matter of urgency; for we view with alarm the daily increasing number of countries acquiring the capacity to produce such weapons: a publication recently circulated to delegations mentions twelve. For the present,

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there is only the nuclear club of the great Powers; but if we do not soon reach an agreement on preventive action, we shall shortly have a club of medium-sized nuclear Powers and even, perhaps, of small Powers. Everything depends on the degree of insecurity of such Powers and the use to which they, individually or collectively, wish to put their resources, whether they are large or small.

My third point concerns the reduction of military budgets. I have already outlined my country's views on the reduction of military budgets on another occasion (ENDC/PV.172, pp. 25, 26), when I said that such a measure is not applicable to Mexico, which has a minimum budget designed to meet its security requirements. All I need now add is that my Government, in its concern to raise the level of living of the people and to eliminate illiteracy, allocates nearly one-fourth of its total budget to education -- that is, three times as much as it allocates to defence. These facts speak for themselves and explain our position.

I do not, of course, wish it to be thought that we are indifferent to such a sound and useful measure as the reduction of military budgets, provided that the reductions are not allocated to other items of the general budget which directly or indirectly contribute to military expenditure, but are converted to peaceful uses, as stipulated in operative paragraph 3 of General Assembly resolution 1931 (XVIII). On the contrary, we consider that it is incumbent on the nuclear Powers, which are the Powers that allocate exorbitant sums to armaments, and on those countries whose military budgets are disproportionate to their national incomes, to reduce their military expenditure.

My fourth point concerns a freeze of strategic nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. We consider that the freeze of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles proposed by the United States is a useful measure, not as a disarmament measure as such, but as an initial measure aimed at halting the arms race and preventing the development of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles of greater destructive power. This measure by itself would admittedly not help to reduce the threat of a nuclear war, for a freeze does not entail destruction. Since, however, the statistics that have been published show that the huge quantity of nuclear weapons which has been accumulated is more than enough to wipe out the entire human race, what point is there in continuing to accumulate these vehicles, which are classed among the most destructive weapons?

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Quite apart from the fact that the accumulation of nuclear weapons conflicts with the main objective of our discussions, the destruction of weapons, the control of these weapons will become increasingly difficult and complex. We therefore believe that this initial measure, which presupposes the gradual reduction of other types of weapon, would contribute to halting the arms race and help us to attain the main objective of our discussions. After hearing the explanations given by the United States representative on 16 April (ENDC/PV.184, pp. 14 et seq.), my delegation considers that the information provided by him enhances the merits of that proposal as a measure for halting the armaments race.

Our fifth observation relates to the elimination of B-47 and TU-16 bombers. We see that the Soviet proposal (ENDC/123), and the United States counter-proposal (ENDC/PV.176, pp. 5 et seq.) for the elimination of an equal number of each type of bomber, have at least one feature in common -- the elimination of these delivery vehicles. If the elimination of obsolete bombers is to have any meaning, it must be accompanied by the destruction of later models, and also of some of the missiles which both Powers possess in superfluity. On this point we are in agreement with Mr. Barrington, the representative of Burma (ENDC/PV.178, p.33).

My delegation believes that, given the goodwill shown by the nuclear Powers on previous occasions when they have reached agreement on other matters, it would perhaps not be difficult for them to come to terms on the types and quantities of armaments to be destroyed. My delegation strongly urges the nuclear Powers to try to reach agreement along these lines, for it considers that such a measure would have a beneficial effect on public opinion in all countries; it would be a first measure of disarmament that would be welcomed by all. My delegation, of course, considers that, in working out all agreements on this and any other collateral measure, the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles (ENDC/5) should always be taken into account.

Finally, my delegation ventures to suggest to the nuclear Powers that, as an earnest of their goodwill and good faith and pending an agreement on the subject, they should refrain from supplying such bombers to other Powers which because of their limited resources cannot continually modernize their weapons, and which regard the models which the great Powers wish to discard as adequate for their needs.

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A climate of mutual trust must be created in order to carry out all these measures. A contribution to this end will be made by the implementation of agreements such as the three concluded last year: the partial Treaty banning nuclear weapons tests (ENDC/100/Rev.1), the establishment of a direct communications link between Washington and Moscow (ENDC/97), and the undertaking to refrain from placing in orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction (A/RES/1884(XVIII); ENDC/117).

The simultaneous decision taken on Monday, 20 April, by the Governments of the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom to decrease the production of plutonium and uranium for the manufacture of nuclear weapons will certainly have the same effect. This agreement would, however, be even more effective if it were converted into a legal instrument, for this would undoubtedly give it greater force.

We hope that the great Powers will continue to take decisions that help to reduce international tension, since this is a prerequisite for the attainment of more important disarmament agreements, particularly those involving inspection or control. These latter agreements will have to be considered when we have exhausted the measures which do not necessitate inspection or control -- and we seem to be drawing steadily closer to such a situation -- and which can be implemented only in an atmosphere of mutual trust.

My delegation will make further statements when we consider it necessary in order to discuss the other collateral measures.

Mr. LUKANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from Russian): On behalf of the Bulgarian delegation I should like to offer our thanks to you personally, Mr. Chairman, and to all our colleagues who have expressed their condolences to the Bulgarian nation on the death of Dimitri Ganev, the Chairman of the Presidium of the National Assembly. Ganev was an outstanding statesman of the new Bulgaria. Our delegation in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament always saw in him a convinced advocate of general and complete disarmament, a convinced advocate of mutual understanding between peoples and States. Once again I beg you to accept our deep gratitude.

The decision of the Governments of three nuclear Powers to reduce the production of fissionable materials has once again given the nations an opportunity to express their yearning for a relaxation of international tension. That decision has been welcomed with satisfaction throughout the world, although it is clearly not disarmament. But it is enough that a new step has been taken along the path which

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was opened up last year by the Moscow Treaty banning nuclear tests in three environments (ENDC/100/Rev.1). It is enough that the possibility of agreement between East and West on problems relating to the question of armaments, particularly nuclear armaments, has once again been confirmed. Each success in improving the international atmosphere makes us glad, both as ordinary citizens and as participants in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Nevertheless, as members of the Committee we are obliged to draw practical conclusions for our own work, which is bound to be inspired by the good example set by the great Powers. In the Eighteen-Nation Committee absolutely all the delegations approved the statements made by Chairman Khrushchev and President Johnson on 20 April (ENDC/131, 132) on reduction of the manufacture of fissionable materials. At the same time the majority of the delegations rightly stressed their agreement with the leaders of the Governments of the Soviet Union and the United States that a good step had been taken but that it is not disarmament, and that, as Mr. Khrushchev said, "it is necessary to go farther". In the light of these statements we are bound to ask ourselves the question: how do matters stand with us, what have we achieved during three months' work? -- moreover, work which began in an atmosphere incomparably better than ever before.

Before telling the Committee how the Bulgarian delegation answers this question and what it will report to its Government and people when they ask about this matter, I should like to make one comment. It is connected with the opinion of certain Western representatives that we should not be dismayed by the slowness and even the lack of results of our work. From a number of statements made by representatives of the West one can draw the conclusion that they consider the Committee's task so difficult and so complicated that it demands no more and no less than that the Eighteen-Nation Committee should transform itself into a permanent body that would go on working for years and years. In this body nothing but verbal disputes would take place, and, moreover, in an elegant form; but one ought not at all to be afraid of this state of affairs, since on the basis of debates in the Committee good decisions are taken by governments.

Even now, in connexion with the statements made by the Governments of the great Powers on the reduction of the manufacture of fissionable materials, we hear again

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in various statements of Western delegations a note of quite unwarranted optimism regarding the past three months' work of the Committee and its prospects on that basis. We do not agree with such optimism. This Committee has not been set up as a body that merely discusses and facilitates the solution of disarmament problems. If, on the basis of its discussions, some positive result is achieved, everybody can only be pleased at this. But to lay stress only on one aspect of the work of the Committee would be tantamount to abandoning the basic purpose for which it has been set up. Therefore, to the question of what we have achieved in the three months' work, we answer: practically no progress has been made in the disarmament negotiations in the Eighteen-Nation Committee:

One-third of 1964 is behind us. Hardly anyone would agree with the words of President Johnson in his message of 21 January last --

"... that the tide has turned -- that further and more far-reaching agreements lie ahead -- and that future generations will mark 1964 as the year the world turned for all time away from the horrors of war and constructed new bulwarks of peace". (ENDC/120).

Hardly anyone, I say, would agree that those words referred only to the reduction of the manufacture of fissionable materials, which, again according to the words of the President of the United States (ENDC/132), is not a declaration of peace. It must be said quite frankly that the United States delegation, like all the other Western delegations, has so far taken no concrete action to bring closer together the positions of the two sides on the basic questions contained in the Committee's agenda; to have done so could really have made the present year a turning-point in the history of the disarmament negotiations.

Above all, through the fault of the Western delegations we are unable to record any progress in accomplishing the main task -- the preparation of a draft treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict international control. Here we have come up against obstacles of a political character due to the fact that the Western Powers, against the will of the peoples, against common sense, against the formal requests contained in resolutions of the United

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Nations, against the opinions of scientists throughout the world, and against the interests of present and future generations of mankind, do not agree with the elimination of the danger of nuclear war right from the outset and before anything else. On this key problem, only the Soviet Union and other socialist countries have made and are continuing to make attempts to bring the positions of the two sides closer together.

Following the Polish delegation (ENDC/FV.185, p.11), we should like to ask the Western representatives whether they could indicate in what way their position on the question of averting a nuclear war has altered since 1962 -- that is, since the beginning of the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee up to the present time. It has not altered in any way at all. There is no justification for such persistence, because we are concerned with mankind, and not with this or that social system which would suffer in the event of a nuclear conflict.

But let us turn to other collateral measures, those in regard to which there are no "doctrinal" controversies. What is the situation we find in this regard, even if we do not consider all but only a few of the proposals submitted?

In the preamble to the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations dated 20 September 1961, it is stated:

"... to facilitate the attainment of general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world it is important that all States abide by existing international agreements, refrain from any actions which might aggravate international tensions ..." (ENDC/5, p.1)

During our debate a number of delegations, in particular the delegations of the United Arab Republic and Burma, have stressed how important it is that States avoid any actions or measures that would raise further obstacles in the way of disarmament while disarmament matters are being discussed. But can one recognize that the policy and actions of the Western Powers take into account this requirement which is so important for our work?

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Let us take, for instance, the question of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons. Everyone recognizes the tremendous danger of a further spread of nuclear weapons, not only for our negotiations but for mankind in general. At the same time we are witnessing actions which confront the world with faits accomplis and which predetermine the failure of the negotiations, or render quite valueless any agreement on so important a matter.

How else can one interpret the decision to create NATO multilateral forces? Can it be supposed that the United States Government does not regard a measure of that kind as violating the relevant United Nations resolutions, as opposing the unequivocal desire of the majority of States to avert any further threat to peace? Can it be supposed that the statesmen of the United States fail to realize that such a measure can only whet the appetites of the West German militarists who claim "equality in armaments", and that it stimulates the aggressive trends in the foreign policy of the Federal Republic of Germany? Lastly, can one believe that the West is deluding itself in regard to the real results to which the creation of NATO multilateral nuclear forces would lead? Of course it is not.

The Western delegations have heard here, in the Committee, the opinion of the majority of delegations -- not just the socialist delegations, but the majority -- that at present there is only one obstacle to the achievement of an agreement on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons: the plans and preparations for the creation of NATO multilateral nuclear forces; that is, in effect, nuclear forces of the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany. What do we see? These forces are being established stealthily and in spite of everything. Is this not a typical example of complete discrepancy between words and deeds?

We see the same position of the Western Powers in regard to the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the States of the NATO and the Warsaw Treaty alliances. Nine months have elapsed since the day when the Western countries accepted a commitment to consult with all their allies with a view to achieving a positive solution to this question (ENDC/101). So far no one has heard a word about the results of the consultations. Instead, every day we hear of intensified consultations in connexion with the organization of a NATO multilateral nuclear

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force and the rearming of the Bundeswehr. How is it possible to reconcile words and deeds in this connexion? Where is the correspondence between statements and actions?

What can one say about the position of the Western Powers on another question that is ripe for solution: the reduction of military budgets? All the delegations welcomed the decision of the Governments of the Soviet Union and the United States to reduce their military budgets for 1964. This step was appreciated as being very useful and in harmony with the spirit of an improving international atmosphere. Besides the socialist delegations, all the delegations of the non-aligned countries supported on that account the proposal for a further, more substantial reduction of expenditures for military needs. The appropriateness of such a partial measure is not denied by the Western delegations either.

But alas! As soon as it comes to matching words with deeds, there is again a backing-out. We are faced with a refusal to discuss the question on its merits and, furthermore, the refusal of the Western delegations to agree even to an appeal to all governments to follow the example of the Soviet Union and the United States. Of course, when the principal allies of the United States -- and particularly the Federal Republic of Germany -- are increasing their military expenditures, it is difficult for the United States delegation to go beyond welcoming words to decisions. Once again we are faced with a manifest contradiction between declarations of good intentions and practical actions in favour of good decisions.

What is even worse, really strange arguments are used against the Soviet proposal to reduce military budgets. It appears that a Soviet military budget of 100 per cent does not embarrass the West, but a Soviet budget of 90 per cent is no good; it requires special verification and analysis and is altogether unacceptable -- because it involves a corresponding decrease in Western military budgets!

There are many examples of the discrepancy between the words and the deeds of the Western Powers and their delegations. But even those which I have mentioned justify the conclusion that a serious review of the position of those delegations in the Disarmament Committee is necessary. It is to be hoped that in the conditions of an improved and improving international atmosphere the Western delegations will really reconsider their positions and thus open the way to further and more substantial agreements.

The CHAIRMAN (United Kingdom): I shall now, with your permission, make a few remarks in my capacity as representative of the United Kingdom. I should like to begin by endorsing the welcome given by the Conference to the decision by the Governments of the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom to cut back the production of fissile material. My Prime Minister has warmly supported the announcement made earlier this week by President Johnson and Mr. Khrushchev that they will be reducing planned production of fissile material for weapon purposes. We extend our congratulations to the United States and Soviet Governments, with which we are proud to have been associated in this important initiative.

May I remind the Conference that the cut-back is a matter in which Her Majesty's Government has always taken a close interest? Indeed, it could be said that this road is one that the United Kingdom has helped to pioneer. As the United Kingdom Secretary of State said here on 25 February:

"... the United Kingdom has ceased production of uranium-235 for military purposes, and military plutonium production is also being gradually brought to an end." (ENDC/PV.169, p.11)

Thus the policies which we have adopted and which we are continuing to pursue have enabled us to contribute fully to this advance. I am sure that this joint decision will do much to strengthen confidence between East and West and to lessen international tension.

It is, I should like to suggest, on the wider implications that we should now focus our attention. With this measure of cut-back achieved, we should turn our thoughts towards the future. The significance of the cut-back lies in good measure in the way in which it throws into relief the problems of controlling fissile material in order to ensure that it is used only for peaceful purposes. The United Kingdom delegation has in the past urged that this is a matter which should be studied by appropriate experts; and today is an opportune moment for me to say that in my Government's view a detailed examination of this question could do much to lay the groundwork for further measures to bring about the ending, with appropriate verification, of the use of fissile material for weapon purposes.

This leads quite naturally into the question of an agreement to prevent the future spread of nuclear weapons, which, like President Johnson's proposals for a freeze of strategic nuclear weapons (ENDC/120), would do so much to create confidence

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by stabilizing nuclear capabilities. In this connexion much has been made by our East European colleagues of the difficulties posed by the possible formation of a multilateral force in NATO. This matter was referred to today, in particular by the representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Tsarapkin. As we have said before, we believe that the fears which have been expressed and were expressed again today are totally unfounded. As Mr. Butler said:

"The existence of a formal agreement which we had all signed would itself constitute a safeguard against a multilateral force which involved the dissemination of nuclear weapons". (ENDC/PV.169, p.11)

But even if we are unable now to secure full agreement on non-dissemination, there remains the United States proposal that the transfer of fissile material should take place under effective international safeguards (ENDC/PV.172, pp.14 et seq.). This would at least be a way of helping to check the proliferation of nuclear weapon capabilities. If we could secure an agreement on this that would apply to all concerned, we should have advanced another step on the path to peace.

In short, these are some of the matters on which we must now concentrate our thoughts and energies, so that the momentum created by the test-ban treaty last year, which has now received fresh impetus from the cut-back of fissile material production, can lead to further measures that will serve the cause of world peace.

I am sure that a careful examination by the Conference of these problems, and of other related problems which are generally classified as "collateral measures", is the best way to further progress. I should like to refer to the extremely thoughtful and interesting address made by our colleague from the United Arab Republic on 9 April, in the course of which he said:

"... we cannot help speculating whether progress might not be more quickly achieved if the negotiations could proceed on the basis of a detailed exploration of the problems involved in each specific measure ..."

(ENDC/PV.182, p.16)

This is all we ask: careful consideration of each proposal by both sides so that we can see exactly what the results will be in practice.

(The Chairman, United Kingdom)

I must admit, therefore, that I am discouraged by the tendency of the Soviet Union and its allies to reject Western suggestions almost immediately they are made, without any consideration or further reflection. After Mr. Fisher's explanation of the United States freeze proposals (ENDC/PV.184, pp.15 et seq.) -- an explanation so full of concentrated thought that I think all of us must have realized that it required careful study of the records before any judgement could properly be made on it -- one could not but be disappointed to find Mr. Tsarapkin apparently turning them down out-of-hand, without apparently taking the trouble to consider whether the explanation given did not offer some way around the objections, however unfounded, that he had previously expressed to this United States proposal.

These objections were echoed today by the representative of Czechoslovakia, who had had time to consider the proposals. I would suggest, with respect, that it was quite clear from what he said that there had been no serious, objective study of the proposals. It seemed to me that any consideration that had been given to the proposals had been directed solely towards finding the same objections that had been made before -- objections which, I say with respect, I found to be singularly weak and, as such, totally unconvincing.

I would also mention the Soviet refusal to admit that the Soviet proposals require any further elaboration, even in the face of enquiries. On 16 April Mr. Tsarapkin spoke of "an endless merry-go-round of questions and answers" (ENDC/PV.184, p.27); but to me it has too often seemed more like a merry-go-round of questions but no answers. For example, on 9 April our United States colleague explained very clearly the difficulties inherent in the deceptively simple Soviet proposal on the subject of military expenditure, and he posed some very pertinent questions about it (ENDC/PV.182, pp.27 et seq.). But in return we were given nothing except the extremely general and qualified reply that the Soviet Union is:

" ... prepared, within the necessary limits, to agree on methods of controlling such an agreement on the reduction of military budgets."

(ibid., p.37)

Surely a whole series of reasonable and carefully-considered questions, on this as on other subjects under discussion, deserves at least some equally reasonable and considered answers. I was disappointed that Mr. Tsarapkin in his statement today

(The Chairman, United Kingdom)

made no attempt to answer these questions or any of the others that had been put to him. He merely reiterated what had been said over and over again by him and by other East European representatives in this Committee.

To continue the quotation to which I have referred, Mr. Hassan in his speech of 9 April said that he considered that there was more likelihood of progress on these lines than by:

"... making such negotiations subject to various conditions or to progress on other measures". (ibid., p.16)

I quite agree with Mr. Hassan that to impose preconditions, sometimes conditions even on the mere examination of a proposal, can only inhibit the development of a useful dialogue. It is bound to prove an obstacle to our attempts to make progress here.

The question of observation posts was raised again by Mr. Tsarapkin today. I must say that I am still unable to see why it is not possible to examine the idea of observation posts without insisting, as he has done and did again today, on prior acceptance of a link between this proposal and the demuclearization of Germany and the withdrawal of foreign troops. On my earlier visit I tabled a paper on observation posts (ENDC/130) which showed, I venture to think, the intrinsic value of such a system. Instead of a consideration of this subject in the manner in which it was put forward, the only response so far has been an unreasoned negative unless certain conditions are met.

I should like to remind Mr. Tsarapkin of what the Canadian representative pointed out on 9 April: these conditions that he mentioned are, anyhow, not measures of disarmament, as is claimed for them, but simply measures of re-deployment (ENDC/PV.182, p.17). To put them forward as measures of disarmament is to launch them under false colours. But, however one might describe such measures, why must they necessarily be linked in even before examination of a useful collateral measure? This is precisely the reverse of what was done last year in separating from an existing package the item which resulted in agreement on the "hot line", or direct communication link (ENDC/97). We believe, with the representative of Nigeria, that there is intrinsic merit in agreeing to set-up observation posts, and can only echo Mr. Obi's appeal, in his speech on 19 March, for "the Soviet Union to seriously consider unwrapping the package" (ENDC/PV.176, p.19).

It does seem to me that there are many and real advantages in proceeding step by step. The establishment of observation posts could be another useful step. What

(The Chairman, United Kingdom)

we have come to call the "bomber bonfire" could be yet another; and to counter this realistic proposal (ibid., pp.5 et seq.) by a totally unrealistic proposal that all bombers should be destroyed (ENDC/123) is, I would suggest, pure stubbornness in putting obstruction in the path of a real opportunity for progress.

On 26 March the Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada, Mr. Martin, spoke of that proposal as "an arrangement which would cover as many bombers as is feasible at the moment" (ENDC/PV.178, p.18). On 25 February my Foreign Secretary Mr. Butler, pointed out that:

"Once the first step in destruction of weapons has been taken, we hope that other more substantial ones may follow." (ENDC/PV.169, p.13) I know that this proposal has been criticized as "inadequate" -- although I would point out that it is not so negligible as all that. But is it not worth while considering it as a practical beginning, which may well lead on to other similar measures? Even to make a start is useful.

To sum up, in the view of the United Kingdom there are several collateral measures which could usefully be pursued, both for the benefits they would bring in themselves and because they would help to break the log-jam which it seems may be in danger of forming. The time has come when we should give them the detailed consideration our colleague of the United Arab Republic has advocated; and they should not be held up by any insistence on imposing links and pre-conditions on discussion.

In these circumstances it is very easy to understand why some of the rest of us, like Mr. Barrington in his speech on 26 March (ENDC/PV.178, pp.32 et seq.), and our colleague from the United Arab Republic on 9 April (ENDC/PV.182, pp.9 et seq.), have sought some way of finding an acceptable combination in the differing sets of proposals. These efforts have been imaginative, and we, for our part, are very appreciative of the thought which has clearly gone into them. For example, it has been suggested by Mr. Barrington that the question of budget reductions might be linked to the proposals for the physical destruction of weapons and for a freeze of weapon production, in order to prevent the effect of these measures being frustrated by further stockpiling. There may well be possibilities in this idea.

(The Chairman, United Kingdom)

But, before we can decide whether it is worth following up, we must clearly work out whether there could be the control and verification necessary for this to be effective and how they could be applied. We have already expressed the view that our Soviet colleague's statement that the Soviet Union is "prepared, within the necessary limits, to agree on methods of controlling such an agreement on the reduction of military budgets" (ENDC/PV.182, p.37) is inadequate as it stands. It may be, as Mr. Obi has said, that the problem of working out a method of control "is not beyond human ingenuity" (ENDC/PV.176, p.19). But we have not so far been shown any sign that our East European colleagues intend to allow our combined ingenuity to be applied to this question.

Similarly, there is a clear relation between the effects we should hope to result from the "bomber bonfire" and the effects of the freeze proposed by our United States colleagues. If a freeze is agreed on, it would prevent new bombers from replacing those destroyed. There is a further connexion between those measures and the effects of a cut-off of the production of weapon-grade fissile material. If we could agree on all these measures-- as we should strongly hope we can --- much of the Soviet criticisms of the freeze and the "bonfire" would no longer be valid. But at this stage, while remaining conscious of these inter-relations, I suggest that we should be wiser to examine each proposal and see how far we can go with each individually rather than stipulate that there must be progress on all if there is to be progress on any.

In conclusion, I renew my appeal to all participants in the Committee to give each proposal full, proper and serious consideration; to avoid adherence to previously-adopted positions and conditions; and to remember, as Sir Paul Mason said on 19 March:

"... it is wrong to refuse to take up a proposal simply because it seems to be small or relatively small ..." (ENDC/PV.176, p.29)

With the cut-back on fissile material production we have made another move forward towards our goal. Let this be an incentive and a challenge to us to move further forward. I feel sure the best method of doing so is by the approach I have outlined.

Mr. FISHER (United States of America): At the beginning of my remarks I should like to join in the expressions of sympathy to our colleague, the representative of Bulgaria, and to his country, on the death of the Chairman of the Presidium of Bulgaria, Mr. Dimitri Ganev.

Three months ago our Conference reconvened in Geneva. We assembled in an atmosphere of hope. We had behind us the record of solid achievement during 1963. We had before us new proposals, offering promise of further progress. That promise is by no means unfulfilled. The cut-back of production of fissionable material recently announced by the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom is a truly significant step. This step could be a beginning towards a verified cut-off of fissionable material production for weapon purposes. This step is renewed evidence that the patient study and deliberations of this Committee play a significant role in paving the way towards peace. This step is also renewed evidence that, with patience and persistence in our search for ways to halt and turn down the arms race, it is possible to take tangible steps towards this goal.

Further progress is possible. The United States delegation has explained in some detail President Johnson's proposals of 21 January for collateral measures (ENDC/120). These proposals would facilitate -- they would bring us closer to -- general and complete disarmament. We hope our exposition of them will furnish a basis for serious study and discussion during the coming months.

One of the most significant of these measures is a verified freeze of the number and characteristics of offensive and defensive strategic nuclear vehicles. This proposal is, in our view, a realistic and workable answer to the upward spiral of the arms race. It is a means of preventing the production of weapons of the future -- surely a more sensible way of proceeding than permitting the production of increasing numbers of such weapons and then considering how to destroy them. The freeze would stabilize our present rough military balance while we move on towards a balanced future programme of disarmament. It would conserve national resources for works of peace and development. It would build confidence by means of verification which do not intrude unduly into areas of national security. For example -- I should like to repeat what I said on 16 April -- "it would not involve verification of the levels or the deployment of existing armaments." (ENDC/PV.184, p.18) Control over the number of missile launchers, which has been discussed this

(Mr. Fisher, United States)

morning, is directed towards limiting and freezing launchers as well as missiles. This does not alter our statement that verification of the levels or deployment of existing armaments would not be involved.

This freeze would be even more meaningful if implemented in conjunction with our proposal for a complete and verified cut-off of the production of fissionable materials for use in nuclear weapons, and substantial transfers to peaceful uses (ENDC/132). In this way, not only would the strategic delivery vehicles be held to present levels and characteristics, but more progress could be made towards the control of nuclear stockpiles. It is a good augury for the future of this proposal that a cut-back of fissionable material production is now being made by all three major producers.

Another of our proposals deals with preventing the dissemination of nuclear weapons and of weapon material. This is actually another kind of freeze. It would ensure against the further spread of nuclear danger while we reach agreement on reducing the present threat. It would ensure against diversion of scarce resources of non-nuclear nations into costly nuclear arms races. In this connexion we have suggested that non-dissemination agreements could be reached by both nuclear and non-nuclear Powers, based on the Irish resolution (A/RES/1665 (XVI)). We have affirmed the United States support for the Irish resolution and have indicated we intend to take no action inconsistent with it. My colleagues will, of course, recall that this resolution envisages an international agreement --

"... under which the nuclear States would undertake to refrain from relinquishing control of nuclear weapons and from transmitting the information necessary for their manufacture to States not possessing such weapons, and ... under which States not possessing nuclear weapons would undertake not to manufacture or otherwise acquire control of such weapons" (A/RES/1665 (XVI)).

In addition to an agreement of this kind, the United States has proposed exploration of an agreement on application of effective international safeguards to the transfer of fissionable materials and equipment for peaceful purposes. In this connexion the United States has offered to place a large power reactor under international safeguards (ENDC/PV.172, p.17).

(Mr. Fisher, United States)

We have proposed, also, a first step in physical disarmament. We have suggested that the Soviet Union join us in destroying a number of our B-47 and their TU-16 bomber aircraft on a one-for-one basis (ENDC/PV.176, pp.5 et seq.). This would take place on our side at a rate greater than the currently-scheduled phase-out rate. These formidable nuclear delivery vehicles, once destroyed, would never again be available for war in the hands of any country. Their destruction would provide experience and example for the further destruction of armaments that may be undertaken in the future. If the freeze of strategic nuclear vehicles were affected at the same time, the result would be a lowered total number of such vehicles. The destroyed bombers, in this case, could not be replaced.

The United Kingdom, in the person of its Foreign Minister and of its Minister of State, has laid before this Conference suggestions for a system of observation posts, which would do much to reduce the danger of war by surprise, miscalculation or accident (ENDC/130). This measure, in and by itself, would increase the military security of both sides in the major military confrontation of our world. It would contribute much to international confidence and would facilitate progress towards future arms control and disarmament measures.

Still further progress towards international stability and confidence for the present could flow from President Johnson's proposal, referred to in his message of 21 January, to --

"... discuss means of prohibiting the threat or use of force, directly or indirectly -- whether by aggression, subversion, or the clandestine supply of arms -- to change boundaries or demarcation lines; to interfere with access to territory; or to extend control or administration over territory by displacing established authorities". (ENDC/120)

During the past three months we have also considered the problems inherent in attaining general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world. These problems involve the questions of balance, verification and peace-keeping. The question of balance is not solved by selective and discriminatory reductions as between conventional and nuclear armaments. The effect of such reductions would be to destroy the balance of power. Imbalanced reductions would be in conflict with the letter and spirit of point 5 of the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles (ENDC/5).

The question of verification relates directly to the problem of armaments retained or produced clandestinely. No nation can accept the risk that, as it disarms, others hoard their arms in a secrecy made possible by inadequate verification.

(Mr. Fisher, United States)

The question of peace-keeping relates to the very heart of general and complete disarmament. We have been criticized for advocating measures designed to strengthen institutions for the maintenance of peace during the disarmament process. But this is exactly what we have agreed is necessary in point 7 of the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles. Retention of a limited number of nuclear delivery vehicles cannot be a substitute for peace-keeping forces and institutions; rather, the crude effectiveness of the nuclear deterrent should gradually give place to a form of peace-keeping more worthy of a civilized world.

It does not ease our task in this connexion to propose the breaking-up of collective self-defence arrangements prior to completion of the disarmament process. Requirements which would result in the disruption of existing defensive arrangements in advance of general disarmament -- such as the precipitate removal of forces and bases -- only tend to put additional obstacles in our way.

President Johnson, speaking in his State of the Union Message regarding the policy of the United States, said that we should be --

"... bold in our search for new agreements which can enlarge the hopes of all, while violating the interests of none."

I think that that description could well apply to our work in this Conference. Our search for agreement must be bold, tireless and thorough. It should make full use of questions, discussion, constructive criticism and careful study, steadily pressing onward towards agreements consonant with our basic goals and principles.

The United States, for its part, will always value constructive criticism and helpful suggestions. We welcome the opportunity to re-study proposals before the Conference in the light of such constructive comments as have been made on them thus far. As our Conference proceeds, we hope to move forward from the presentation phase to discussion in depth of proposals which offer prospects of further progress. As President Johnson said of his proposals to this Conference on 21 January, we are always --

"... ready to conclude firm agreements in these areas and to consider any other reasonable proposal" (ENDC/120).

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 186th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. Peter Thomas, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, representative of the United Kingdom.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union, Mexico, Bulgaria, the United Kingdom and the United States.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 28 April 1964, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.

